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ABSTRACT
Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) with their trusted Certificate Au-
thorities (CAs) provide the trust backbone for the Internet: CAs
sign certificates which prove the identity of servers, applications, or
users. To be trusted by operating systems and browsers, a CA has
to undergo lengthy and costly validation processes. Alternatively,
trusted CAs can cross-sign other CAs to extend their trust to them.
In this paper, we systematically analyze the present and past state
of cross-signing in the Web PKI. Our dataset (derived from passive
TLS monitors and public CT logs) encompasses more than 7 years
and 225 million certificates with 9.3 billion trust paths. We show
benefits and risks of cross-signing. We discuss the difficulty of re-
voking trusted CA certificates where, worrisome, cross-signing can
result in valid trust paths to remain after revocation; a problem for
non-browser software that often blindly trusts all CA certificates
and ignores revocations. However, cross-signing also enables fast
bootstrapping of new CAs, e.g., Let’s Encrypt, and achieves a non-
disruptive user experience by providing backward compatibility. In
this paper, we propose new rules and guidance for cross-signing to
preserve its positive potential while mitigating its risks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Network security.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Public key infrastructures (PKIs) like the Web PKI, provide the trust
infrastructure for many applications in today’s Internet. They, e.g.,
enable webbrowsers, or apps on mobile operating systems (OS),
to authenticate servers for secure online banking, web shopping,
or password entry. Governments use PKIs for authentication in
privacy-preserving health systems, remote functionality of admin-
istrative offices, or electronic voting [3, 32, 89, 91].
Certificate Authorities (CAs) serve as trust anchors in PKIs and
have the ability to issue trusted certificates to companies and indi-
viduals. The security of a PKI relies on benign and correct acting of
all its CAs. Despite audit processes, there have been several cases of
severe CA misbehavior or security breaches: In 2011, the DigiNotar
CAwas compromised [77]. This caused its removal from root stores.
All DigiNotar issued certificates became untrusted. In the following
years, a range of new security measures were introduced to reduce
the impact of future compromises [2]. However, most face small
deployment and thus have limited effect [2]. Along this path, the
Certification Authority Browser (CAB) Forum gradually increased
the requirements that CAs must fulfill to remain in root stores.
Alternatively, trusted CAs can cross-sign other CAs to extend
their trust to them—thereby mitigating the lengthy and costly vali-
dation process that new CAs need to undergo. Cross-signing de-
scribes the approach to obtain signatures from several issuers for
one certificate1. It enables new CAs to quickly establish trust. A
prominent example is the bootstrapping of Let’s Encrypt, which
issued trusted certificates based on a cross-sign of their CA certifi-
cates by the already trusted CA IdenTrust while applying for root
store inclusion of their own root certificate [42]. Cross-signing also
ensures broad validation of certificates in face of divergent root
stores of OSes or applications.
However, cross-signing also bears risks: as cross-signs are not
systematically tracked [80], cross-signing can challenge proper
revocation of certificates in case of CA misbehavior, erroneous op-
eration, or stolen keys. The complexity added by cross-signs already
resulted in too broad application of certificate revocation [31, 94].
In this paper, we show that cross-signs also can lead to certificates
remaining valid when their CA was distrusted; that the complexity
of existing cross-signs makes revocation difficult; that different
software and operating systems do not always thoroughly revoke
certificates; and that cross-signing makes it difficult to track revo-
cation of CA certificates, especially for non-browser software.
In this paper, we perform the first systematic study of the use and
security effects of cross-signing (also known as cross certification),
which is one major reason for missing transparency in PKIs [80].
1Technically, cross-signing creates several certificates that share subject and public
key as each certificate has exactly one issuer.
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For this, we use a passive TLS data-set that contains information
about more than seven years of real-world TLS usage, containing
more than 225 million certificates derived from more than 300
billion connections—which provides us with insights on the effect
of cross-signs on real user connections. For a broad coverage of CA
certificates, we combine this private, user-centered dataset with
publicly available data from Certificate Transparency (CT) logs.
The main contributions of our paper are as follows:
• We provide a classification of different cross-sign patterns
and analyze themwith respect to their benefits, but also their
risks of unexpected effects on the trust system.
• We systematically analyze the use of cross-signing in PKI
systems, with a focus on the Web PKI. Thereby, we reveal
problematic cross-signs that render certificate revocation or
root store removals ineffective, leading to unwanted valid
trust paths. We also find legit use cases, e.g., cross-signing
enabled the quick tremendous success of Let’s Encrypt, eases
the transition to progressive cryptography while maintain-
ing compatibility for legacy applications, and makes a single
certificate trusted across different applications and operating
systems, achieving a non-disruptive user experience.
• We propose new rules and guidance for cross-signing to
preserve its positive potential but mitigate enclosed risks.
2 BACKGROUND
This section gives a brief overview of how CAs establish trust,
how trust is anchored in root stores, and how certificate revoca-
tion is applied today. For a thorough description of PKIs and their
fundamental concepts, we refer readers to [28, 46].
Operating systems and some web browsers maintain root stores.
They serve as trust anchors when validating certificates: To be valid,
a certificate must be issued—directly or indirectly—by a trusted root
certificate, i.e., a certificate that is included in the root store. Root
certificates mostly issue intermediate certificates which can issue
further intermediate or leaf certificates. Figure 1 shows an example
with several root (Ri ), intermediate (Ii ), and leaf (Li ) certificates.
In case of breaches like stolen private keys, certificates have to be
revoked. Revocation information is traditionally distributed by CAs
using Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [47] or interactively using
OCSP [38]. However, these mechanisms mostly remain unused
due to (i) the overhead for distribution and (ii) inherent privacy
concerns [53, 85]. Applications thus often solely rely on the current
state of the operating system’s root store.
Consequently, Browsers and operating systems have started ship-
ping vendor-controlled CRLs. Mozilla uses OneCRL [39], Google
CRLSets [79] and a blacklist [78]; Microsoft and Apple include in-
formation on blocked CA certificates in their root stores [50, 59].
3 CROSS-SIGNING
We next introduce cross-signing and provide a classification of the
different cross-signing patterns used in the remainder of the paper.
3.1 Cross-signing: Definition
We illustrate cross-signing with a typical use-case: To issue trusted
certificates, a CA must be included in the respective root stores of
web browsers, operating systems, etc. Inclusion in these root stores
CA1 CA2 CA3
root
store
I5
R1 R2 R3
I1 I2 I3 I4
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
I4
R3
I5
XS-Cert
L6
I5
Figure 1: An example PKI including a cross-sign (I5 + I ′5).
requires time demanding audit and certification processes. During
the process of being included in root stores, a CA may already want
to issue trusted certificates. To this end, another CAtrusted, whose
certificate is already included in root stores, cross-signs the CA’s
root or intermediate certificate to create a trust path that ends in
the already trusted root certificate of CAtrusted. In Figure 1, the
intermediate certificate I5 is cross-signed by I4, providing a trust
path to R2. As real-world example, Let’s Encrypt has been using an
intermediate certificate cross-signed by IdenTrust to already issue
certificates while waiting for root store inclusion of its own root
certificate [42]. Similarly, CAs that are included in only some root
stores can use cross-signing to extend trust to further root stores.
CAs typically call this cross-signing (also cross-certification) and
the resulting certificates cross-certificates [42, 43]. Analogously,
RFC 5280 defines a cross-certificate as a CA certificate that has
different entities as issuer and subject [6]. In this paper, we use a
broader definition: (i) To analyze cross-signing for all certificate
types, i.e., root, intermediate, and leaf certificates, we consider all
certificates, not only CA certificates. (ii) To also track effects of
signing a certificate with multiple CA certificates of the same entity,
we only require signatures by two different CA certificates, but not
that issuer and subject are controlled by different entities.
Specifically, our definition is as follows (cf. Figure 1). To cross-sign
a certificate (here: I5) that was originally issued by R3, a CA certifi-
cate (here: I4) creates and signs a copy I ′5 which has the same subject
and public key as I5. This process is necessary as each certificate has
exactly one issuer field [6], i.e., issuer (I5) = R3 , issuer (I ′5) = I4.
Thus, a cross-sign is a certificate for which another certificate exists
that has the same subject and public key, but a different issuer and
signature. These certificates form a cross-sign certificate (XS-Cert).
The certificates of a XS-Cert can be used interchangeably: If I5 and
I ′5 are CA certificates, a certificate issued by I5 will also validate
using I ′5. In more detail: when a certificate is validated, the validat-
ing software searches a CA certificate whose subject equals the
issuer of the current certificate. It then checks that the signature
of the current certificate validates against the public key of the CA
certificate. As all certificates of a XS-Cert share subject and public
key, I5 and I ′5 can be used interchangeably.
Note that there is a difference between cross-signing and cer-
tificate re-issuances without re-keying. When a certificate reaches
the end of its validity, it often is replaced by a certificate with the
same subject, key and a new validity period. We need to distinguish
these cases from cross-signing. Telling them apart is complicated
since cross-signs often (and legitimately) do not have the exact
same validity periods as the original certificate, e.g., because the
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Figure 2: Cross-signing types. We observe many root, inter-
mediate and leaf XS-Certs in our dataset. Luckily, leaf-mix
XS-Certs remain a theory:We find no such problematic case.
not before field should correspond to the issuance date [67]. As, e.g.,
GoDaddy allows for a renewal of certificates up to 120 days prior to
expiration, we require certificates to have an overlapping validity
period of at least 121 days to be considered cross-signs.
3.2 Cross-signing: Classification
For our analysis of cross-signing and corresponding risks for the
PKI, we classify XS-Certs into 4 types. These types depend on the
type of certificates in the XS-Cert. We illustrate this in Figure 2.
Root XS-Certs. A root XS-Cert comprises at least two CA cer-
tificates of different issuers. At least one of them is part of a root
store (cf. Figure 2a). When CAs use the term cross-signing, they
typically refer to this type. This approach extends trust to root
stores that do not include a CA’s root certificate and can extend a
CA’s trust to more applications or operating systems. Likewise, an
already trusted root can bootstrap trust in a new CA certificate by
cross-signing it. Moreover, CAs can start to use a new CA certificate
without disrupting compatibility with old applications that do not
receive root store updates. However, as we will discuss later, such
cross-signs increase the complexity of removing trust in certificates
that are part of a root store. Trust paths can inadvertently remain
valid via paths using other certificates of the XS-Cert (Section 5.1).
Intermediate XS-Certs. Intermediate XS-Certs contain two or
more intermediate CA certificates from different issuers, but no root
store certificate (cf. Figure 2b). They are similar to root XS-Certs,
but no certificate in the XS-Cert is directly trusted by root store
maintainers. The same benefits (bootstrapping, large trust coverage,
and compatibility with old applications) apply. Additionally, CAs
without an own root certificate may employ such cross-signing to
root trust in multiple CAs, and thus achieve independence from a
single business partner. However, intermediate XS-Certs also are
problematic if certificate revocations are not thoroughly applied to
all certificates of a XS-Cert (cf. Section 5.1).
Leaf XS-Certs. Leaf XS-Certs contain only leaf certificates (cf.
Figure 2c). This could in principle be used in cases where some client
applications only trust divergent CAs; Here, the server can send
that certificate of which it knows that it will be trusted by the client,
e.g., using the user agent data in an HTTP request to determine
the client’s root store. As leaf certificates cannot issue certificates,
problematic cases are limited in scope. Still, for a revocation in
case of a security incident, all certificates of the XS-Cert have to be
revoked – otherwise insecure certificates remain valid.
Leaf-Mix XS-Certs (Theoretical). In theory, a XS-Cert could con-
tain leaf certificates and (root or intermediate) CA certificates (cf.
Figure 2d). Private keys of CA certificates have special protection
requirements such as the use of sealed hardware. As private keys
of leaf certificates are typically present on comparably vulnerable
end-systems, a leaf-mix XS-Cert would put a key that can issue
certificates at high risk. Fortunately, our dataset does not contain
any valid leaf-mix XS-Certs.
4 DATASETS AND METHODOLOGY
The analysis in this paper is based on a dataset of certificates used
in the wild. The certificates are passively collected from the out-
going SSL/TLS connections on all ports of several universities and
research networks mainly located in North America. Beyond public
data (e.g., CT Logs), it also contains certificates that are not publicly
available (e.g., user or private certificates) and thereby enables us to
take a broad yet unseen perspective on cross-signing. Our dataset
spans a period of more than 7 years, starting February 2012 and
ending August 2019, covering more than 300 billion TLS connec-
tions. For a broad view on CA certificates, we extend this dataset
with CA certificates from CT logs2 (those logs used by crt.sh [57]).
The passive data collection effort was cleared by the respective
responsible party at every contributing institution. Our collection
effort focuses on machine to machine communication and excludes
or anonymizes sensitive information. See Appendix A for details.
We release the toolchain [45] that enables the analysis of the
cross-signing relationships of X.509 certificates from any source
(e.g., Censys [33] or CT logs [57]). Since that part of our data set
derived from passive measurements is subject to NDAs and contains
private certificates that are not contained in public repositories, we
are unable to release our data set. Our toolchain can, however, be
used to reproduce our analysis using other data sources, e.g., CT.
We validate certificates using our custom validation logic which
closely mirrors the way browsers perform certificate validation. We
build potential paths using name-matching between subject and
issuer fields. Unlike browsers, we build all possible paths from a
certificate to root certificates3. We do not just search for the shortest
possible path. To this end, we check each path separately by passing
the complete path to OpenSSL for validation and using only the
specific root certificate for this path as trust anchor. We obtain the
earliest and latest possible validity dates based on the not before
and not after dates of the path’s certificates and use these for the
validation. We also check if a path is valid given the path-length-
constraints of its CA certificates. To obtain validity information for
2These contain 156,315 CA certificates, however, 147,439 of them are used for Google
Certificate Transparency (Precert Signing) which we exclude from our analysis. Further
2,635 are already included in our passive dataset. CT thus adds 6,241 CA certificates.
3Due to computational complexity, we base our evaluation for some CT certificates on
all paths of length 12 or smaller (multiple million paths per certificate); for the vast
majority of certificates, also longer paths were validated and used.
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a certificate, all found paths and validity period(s) of the certificate
are mapped to the corresponding root store versions—based on the
trust status of a path’s root certificate in root stores over time.
We use the root stores of major operating systems, web browsers,
and grid networks and consider certificate additions as well as
removals across their versions. Specifically, we use the root stores
of Microsoft [30], Apple (iOS, OSX) [49], Google (Android) [40],
Mozilla (Firefox, Linux distributions) [62], and the grid computing
PKI [36]. We also include the PKIs of the governments of the United
States [41], Australia [69], Switzerland [86], Oman [72], Netherlands
[73], Japan [71], India [70], and Estonia [5].
We test for revocations based on browser revocation lists, i.e.,
Mozilla’s OneCRL, Google’s CRLSets and blacklist, Apple’s lists
of blocked certificates, and Microsoft’s root store program. We
also use revocation status information from crt.sh for CA CRLs
and Microsoft’s disallowedcert.stl blacklist to cross-check with the
former web browser or operating system revocation mechanisms.
Our dataset includes 225,243,355 certificates of which 23,504,394
are valid4 (720 only due to inclusion in a root store; 23,503,674 have
a valid path to a root store). We focus our analysis on these valid
certificates. They split into 9,197 CA certificates, 23 self-signed
X509v1 certificates, 3 self-signed X509v3 certificates using legacy
extensions to show their CA status, and 23,495,171 leaf certificates.
793 certificates are included in at least one of our used root stores
(all 694 self-signed CA certificates, the 23 self-signed X509v1 and 3
X509v3 legacy certificates, and 73 not self-signed CA certificates;
All the latter 73 certificates are already valid due to their root store
inclusion but additionally provide paths to other trusted roots).
To give a short overview of our dataset:We see 526 of the 793 root
certificates being used—meaning that we found another certificate
that was signed by them in our dataset. In total, we find more
than 9.3 billion valid paths between the certificates in our dataset.
The longest path is 17 certificates long (including root and leaf).
We find 63 certificates with this path length. In the entirety of
our measurement, the root CA against which we can validate the
most certificates was the IdenTrust DST Root CA X3 (with 8,473,760
certificates). This is probably driven by their cross-sign of Let’s
Encrypt which we will detail later in this paper. The Let’s Encrypt
ISRG Root X1 follows as a close second with 8,382,825 certificates.
The CA to which we can find most unique paths is the Comodo
AddTrust External CA Root CA. For this root, we can find 3.7 billion
different validation paths for a total of 5,966,846 distinct certificates.
The maximum number of different validation paths (as in different
paths through the CA ecosystem through which we could validate
it) for a CA certificate we foundwas 45,225,135. These paths provide
validity for the intermediate IdenTrust Global Common Root CA 1.
Taking a look at cross-signs, we find a total of 47,543 XS-Certs.
These split into 86 root, 236 intermediate, and 47,221 leaf XS-Certs5.
For the remainder of this paper, we focus our analysis on root and
intermediate CA certificates as these cross-signs impact the trust of
thousands or millions of leaf-certificates. We however note that it is
4 147,439 invalid certificates are for Google Certificate Transparency Precert Signing
(excluded from analysis). Most other invalid certificates are a side effect of observing
real Internet traffic: 70% are used for user authentication in the grid and not trusted
by CAs. Auto-generated certificates for Tor or WebRTC account for 17% and 1%,
respectively. 9% are self-signed. The remaining 3% comprise IoT and firewall certificates.
Earlier studies already found invalid certificates to be common in the web [26].
5The number of leaf XS-Certs is solely based on our passive dataset.
interesting that there is a significant number of leaf XS-Certs which
may bring along the same problems as cross-signed CA certificates,
e.g., incomplete revocation. We note that CRLite [54] (now being
integrated in Firefox) potentially enables large scale revocation for
leaf certificates—by reducing the overhead for CRL updates with
efficient Bloom filter-based incremental updates.
No clear phenomenon explains the leaf XS-Certs: For 63% of
leaf XS-Certs, one CA issued all certificates (multiple CAs: 37%).
DigiCert is involved in 67% of leaf XS-Certs (45% of those stem
from Symantec before DigiCert acquired it), followed by GoDaddy
(10%) and Comodo (8%). Let’s Encrypt, however, is involved in only
significantly less than 1% of cases. In future work it might be worth
trying to explore the motivation behind these cases.
When analyzing the root and intermediate XS-Certs, we find
internal and external cross-signs. Internal XS-Certs comprise only
certificates that have been issued within the same CA group, i.e.,
issuer and certificate owner are controlled by the same entity. For
example, we find the two largest CA groups, Comodo6 and Dig-
iCert, to internally cross-sign certificates within and across their
subsidiary CAs, both considered internal cross-signing.
External XS-Certs cross boundaries of CA groups, i.e., issuer
and certificate owner of at least one certificate of the XS-Cert are
controlled by different entities. These are particularly interesting as
issuing CAs take responsibility for the actions of the resulting inter-
mediates [63]; whereas the information flow between organizations
may be limited, challenging fast and thorough revocation.
We find internal and external cross-signing for both, root (58 in-
ternal / 28 external) as well as intermediate (70 / 166) XS-Certs. For
intermediate CA certificates, we find 124 cases where the organiza-
tion does not have their own root certificate. These organizations
are completely dependent on the cross-signs from their issuers.
In addition to these XS-Certs, we also identify 97,240 cases of
certificate re-issuances. Certificate re-issuances are similar to cross-
signing: there are several certificates using the same subject and
key. The difference to XS-Certs is that the validity periods of these
certificates overlap only slightly or not at all (note that key-reuse
across certificates with different subjects clearly distinguishes from
cross-signing). We only consider cases as XS-Certs if their cer-
tificate’s validities overlap for 121 or more days (cf. Section 3.1)
and exclude re-issuances from our following discussion. Notably,
certificate re-issuing is prevalent for leaf certificates (97,233) and al-
most non-existent when root (1) or intermediate (6) certificates are
involved. We still analyzed the latter, but found them uninteresting.
5 CROSS-SIGNS IN THEWILD
In this section, we systematically analyze the use of cross-signing
in existing PKIs. To identify the different categories of cross-signing
and their motivation, we start off from its primary goal: extending
certificate trust—exploiting all derived trust paths in our dataset.
We combine the derived validity status in root stores (over time)
with revocation data and enrich this with knowledge on ownership
and (governmental-)control over CAs, and algorithmic properties
of certificates. We overview the identified categories in Table 1 with
their number of occurrence in our dataset(s). We focus on (i) the
6By Comodo, we refer to the CA business, which was recently renamed to Sectigo to
avoid naming confusion with the separate company Comodo Group [29]
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Table 1: Observed XS-Certs by category. Numbers marked
with ∗ are based on manual investigation of the passive
dataset. A XS-Cert can count to multiple categories.
 Valid after revocation 16 ∗
PKI barrier breaches 7 ∗
○ Bootstrapping 57
+⧸- Expanded trust (new stores / longer time) 64 / 46
+⧸- Alternative paths 155
+⧸- Support of multiple signature algorithms 23
+⧸- Ownership change 35 ∗
 Backdating 7 ∗
 Missing transparency 2 ∗
bad : potential and exploited security problems (Sections 5.1 -
5.2), (ii) the good○ : ease bootstrapping of new CAs (Section 5.3),
(iii) cases with pros and cons [+⧸-], e.g., the transition to new crypto-
graphic algorithms (Sections 5.4 - 5.6), and (iv) the ugly behavior
due to problematic practices and lacking transparency (Section 5.7).
5.1 Valid Paths After Revocations
Cross-signs significantly complicate the revocation of CA certifi-
cates. When a CA certificate is revoked, all of its cross-signs need to
be revoked as well. A single remaining unrevoked cross-sign means
that a valid path to a trusted root still exists—and all certificates
of the revoked CA can still be validated. As we will show in this
section, cross-signing repeatedly caused incomplete revocations, or
even added new valid trust paths for already revoked certificates.
We next empirically study this problem of valid paths after revo-
cation that adds an additional layer of complexity to the already
fragile revocation mechanisms in PKIs. We focus our discussion
on cross-signs that caused incomplete revocations for WoSign and
DigiNotar as well as incomplete revocations in vendor-controlled
CRLs (especially Mozillas’ OneCRL and Googles’ CRLSet).
5.1.1 The WoSign and StartCom Ban. WoSign was distrusted by
major root store holders after a series of misbehaviors [64] (see
Figure 3 for a timeline of events). WoSign did not announce the
acquisition of the StartCom CA in time. It also evaded rules for
distrusting SHA1-signed certificates issued after January 1st 2016
by backdating the not before date7 of certificates they issued. As a
result, Mozilla set up a special not before rule, i.e., for certificates that
were issued after October 21, 2016, Mozilla distrusted paths that
end in a WoSign or StartCom root [96]. In January 2018, Mozilla
completely removed these roots [96, 97]. Google performed similar
actions, removing WoSign and StartCom roots around September
2017 [92, 93], as did Apple and Microsoft [4, 88].
By analyzing cross-signs, we observe that WoSign certificates
were cross-signed by Comodo subsidiaries, Certplus, Unizeto Cer-
tum, and StartCom. Furthermore, in April 2017—after Google and
Mozilla set up not before rules for certificates issued by WoSign and
StartCom—the widely trusted Certinomis - Root CA cross-signed
the StartCom EV SSL ICA (see Figure 3). The StartCom EV SSL ICA
intermediate was issued a few days before by StartCom Certification
7The certificate’s not before date defines from which time on the certificate is valid,
but it is also used as an indicator for the issuance date of the certificate [67].
2016 2017 2018 2019
WoSign/StartCom ...
not trusted in store
certs issued later are
valid path via XS*
− removed from store
26 Sep
Windows 10
1 Dec
Apple
1 Jan
SHA1 deprecated
Sep
− Google
21 Oct
Mozilla/Google
Jan
−Mozilla
4 Oct
Comodo revokes XSs
18 Oct
Certinomis revokes XS*
mid 2019»
Certinomis −
Sep
OneCRL/CRLSet add XS*
2027»
XS* expiry
13 Apr
Certinomis: XS*
Figure 3: Certinomis’ cross-sign of WoSign/StartCom (XS*)
bypassed not before rules ( ) set up by major root stores.
Authority G3 and thus was affected by the not before rules set up by
Google and Mozilla, rendering it unable to issue trusted certificates.
However, the new Certinomis cross-sign bypassed the not before
rules as it established a trust path to a root that was not operated by
WoSign or StartCom, enabling StartCom to issue valid certificates
despite its ban. After discovery, Mozilla and Google revoked the
cross-sign. Mozilla added it to OneCRL in September 2017 [22, 66].
One month later, Certinomis also added the certificate to its CRL.
In the end, this incident added to a list of issues that led to the
distrust of Certinomis in mid 2019. Overall, the cross-sign provided
undesired valid trust paths for about 6 months. In our dataset, this
affected 11 certificates. We saw a subset of them in a small amount
of connections during this 6 month period. This result highlights
the complexity of revocation when cross-signing is involved. A
cross-signing CA not only has to keep track of the cross-sign (as
for any issued intermediate), but must also carefully examine and
track actions applied to the cross-signed certificate.
The other cross-signs of WoSign/StartCom did not result in any
undesired trust paths. We briefly discuss them to further stress the
complexity of CA revocations given cross-signs. WoSign received
several cross-signs before its ban. Keynectic’s Certplus Class 1 Pri-
mary CA, which was part of the Microsoft root store, cross-signed
threeWoSign CA certificates. These cross-signs were never revoked.
This only did not cause any undesired trust paths because Microsoft
set up a not before November 16, 2016 rule for the Certplus root in
September 2017 and disabled the Certplus root in May 2018.
Mozilla and Google, however, could have been more thorough
when revoking WoSign and StartCom. WoSign’s roots Certification
Authority of WoSign and Certification Authority of WoSign G2 set up
four (internal) intermediate XS-Certs:WoSign Class 3 OV Server CA
G2,WoSign Class 4 EV Server CA G2,WoSign Class 4 EV Pro Server
CA G2, andWoSign Class 3 OV Pro Server CA G2. Despite these cross-
sign’s expiry not before November 2029, none of them was revoked
in OneCRL or CRLSet when WoSign was distrusted. While our data
shows that this was not necessary in this case as corresponding
roots are revoked, an explicit revocation can prevent undesirable
trust paths—e.g. if there was another unknown cross-sign, or if
WoSign was able to obtain new cross-signs for its intermediates.
Comodo explicitly revoked its cross-signs when Mozilla started
to distrust WoSign in 2016. Specifically, cross-signs of the Certifica-
tion Authority of WoSign by Comodo’s UTN-USERFirst-Object and
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UTN-DataCorp SGC were revoked. Similarly, Unizeto Certum CA
revoked its cross-sign of Certificate Authority of WoSign G2 in 2016.
We also find that StartCom cross-signed WoSign certificates
years before being acquired by them, going back to at least 2006
(details in Appendix B.1). This shows a close business relationship
between them years before the (not timely reported) acquisition
of StartCom by WoSign in 2015. This cross-signing behavior also
continued after the acquisition. In this regard, the analysis of cross-
signs can provide a rich source of information for security research.
5.1.2 Incomplete DigiNotar Revocation. After a security incident
at DigiNotar in 2011, an attacker was able to obtain certificates for
several domains, including Google and Mozilla’s add-on domains.
As a result, Mozilla distrusted all DigiNotar root certificates [68].
Our data shows that DigiNotar Root CA was cross-signed by En-
trust.net Secure Server CA in 2007, creating an intermediate which
was valid up to August 2013. Both, root and cross-sign, were re-
voked byMicrosoft, Google, andMozilla in 2011: Microsoft removed
the root from its root store and blocked the intermediate. Likewise,
Google added both certificates to Chrome’s blacklist disabling all
certificates that use the corresponding public key8, including ex-
isting and possible future cross-signs. Mozilla, as OneCRL was
not introduced before 2015 [39], implemented a special revocation
mechanism to disable the root cert. However, applications that base
their trust on the certificates in the root store of Mozilla, Google, or
Microsoft, often do not support their special revocationmechanisms.
As the cross-signing root Entrust.net Secure Server CA remained in
root stores until 2015 (Mozilla, Google) or longer (Microsoft, Apple),
such applications still established a valid path until expiry of the
DigiNotar cross-sign in August 2013. Hence, applications were at
risk to accept certificates issued by DigiNotar Root CA up to two
years after the distrust of DigiNotar roots because of the cross-sign.
5.1.3 Incomplete Vendor-Controlled CRLs. Most applications do
not perform certificate revocation checks—especially not for CA
certificates (see Section 2). Instead, many browsers and operating
systems ship their own revocation lists, which they have to keep
updated. The security of the web PKI thus also depends on how
consistently cross-signed certificates are revoked. In this section, we
examine these lists and show that cross-signs are not consistently
revoked. This further highlights the complexities of cross-signs.
In 2011, the Actalis Authentication Root CA created the inter-
mediate Actalis Authentication CA G2. A cross-sign by Baltimore
CyberTrust Root enabled broad trust. The Actalis Authentication
CA G2 was later revoked by Actalis with “cessation” given as the
reason in November 2016. The same is true for the cross-sign by Cy-
berTrust. OneCRL included these revocations, but Google lists only
the Actalis intermediate in its CRLSet. Hence, the cross-sign still
works for devices using Google’s root store—like Android phones.
This affected 13 certificates we saw in traffic; they were recognized
as valid for two years until expiry of the cross-sign.
Another revocation inconsistency affects the internal interme-
diate XS-Cert GlobalSign Extended Validation CA - SHA256 - G2.
The first certificate issued by GlobalSign Root CA - R2 was revoked
in September 2019 due to cessation of operation, but GlobalSign
8Technically, Chrome’s blacklist lists hashes of the certificate’s SubjectPublicKeyInfo
(SPKI), i.e., the encoded public key.
did not revoke the cross-sign by GlobalSign Root CA - R3. OneCRL
(Mozilla) and CRLSet (Google) mimic this inconsistency [23]. Lack-
ing any explanation, we believe that the cross-sign should have
been revoked, too. In this case, we did not find any non-expired
certificates affected by this.
The intermediate XS-Cert Entrust Certification Authority - L1E
shows a similar revocation inconsistency: While Entrust Root Cer-
tification Authority revoked the corresponding intermediates in
July 2018, the cross-sign by Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048)
was not revoked before February 2019, i.e., seven months later.
Google’s CRLSet even missed revoking one of the earlier CRL-
revoked cross-sign. Although no severe security problem evolved
(the intermediate was intentionally superseded and all issued cer-
tificates expired before the initial revocation), both cases show that
already cross-signing within a CA can inadvertently prolong the
validity of certificates, let alone cross-signing across CAs.
Three intermediate XS-Certs of the US Federal PKI show incon-
sistent revocation states. For all three (DoD Interoperability Root CA
2, NASA Operational CA, and DHS CA4), one intermediate was re-
voked via CRL, marking them as superseded. However, correspond-
ing cross-sings were not revoked; without an obvious explanation.
Vendor-controlled CRLs did not even add the revoked certificates.
A total of 10, 5,725 and 4 certificates were affected, respectively.
Finally, special cross-signing-related requests of CAs can further
complicate the maintenance of vendor-controlled CRLs. Specifically,
the root XS-Cert Belgium Root CA2 was cross-signed by GlobalSign
Root CA and CyberTrust Global Root. While the former cross-sign
expired in 2014, Belgium requested an inclusion of the CyberTrust-
issued cross-sign in OneCRL in October 2017 because the interme-
diate is no longer used to issue TLS certificates [18]. This request
created a very narrow-band revocation as it affects only applica-
tions that use OneCRL, i.e., mostly Firefox: First, neither Google
nor Microsoft block the cross-sign in their vendor-controlled CRLs.
Second, the root is still included in Apple’s root store today (and
was never included in any other) until its expiry in 2021. Third, the
cross-sign is not included in the CA’s CRL, probably as CRLs lack a
mechanism to revoke certificates for specific key usages (notably,
the only allowed key usage for the root are Certificate Sign and
CRL Sign). On the positive side, we can not provide evidence for
a real world relevance of this inconsistency: All observed issued
certificates already expired before the (incomplete) revocation.
Takeaway: Cross-Signing resulted in incomplete revocations or
even added new valid trust paths for already revoked certificates. Thus,
coping with cross-signing consequences adds a further burden to the
important but fragile revocation mechanisms in PKIs. Consequently,
we propose adapted mechanisms that ease the revocation in face of
cross-signing. Furthermore, CAs should be required to publicly disclose
and explain inconsistencies even if they serve a benign purpose.
5.2 PKI Barrier Breaches
Next, we show how cross-signing can enable a valid trust path
between otherwise isolated PKIs—a potentially undesired effect.
We discuss how cross-signs intentionally or inadvertently cause
breaches of such PKI boundaries, e.g., by making state-controlled
PKI systems trusted by the Web PKI. We show this effect on two
examples of the Federal PKI and the Swiss Government PKI.
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5.2.1 Undesired Global Trust in the FPKI. The Federal PKI (FPKI)
provides PKI functionality for US government services. While the
FPKI was part of the Apple and Microsoft root programs till 2018,
it never was accepted by Mozilla [8, 65]. However, we find several
cross-signs of FPKI CAs by widely trusted Web-PKI CAs. As the
FPKI extensively uses internal cross-signs among its CA certificates,
this trust in single CA certificates expanded to a large part of the
FPKI. As a result, many applications that use the Mozilla root store
unknowingly trusted certificates issued by the FPKI, even though
it did never fulfill the necessary root store policies [8, 65]. As the
FPKI applied for trust by Mozilla since 2009 [8] (aborted in 2018),
the cross-signs could be seen as attempt by the FPKI to bootstrap (cf.
Section 5.3) trust in Mozilla’s rootstore in parallel. However, at the
time of cross-signing, the public discussion on the FKPI’s applica-
tion for trust already called out concerns regarding the eligibility of
affected certificates [8]. These concerns should also have prevented
the cross-signs. This is especially worrisome since state-controlled
PKI systems can suffer from potential political influence [84].
We start our analysis with the intermediate XS-Cert Federal
Bridge CA 2013. This intermediate was issued in 2013 by the Federal
Bridge CA and two years later cross-signed by the Federal Common
Policy CA. More importantly, also in 2015, it was cross-signed by
widely trusted CA certificates of IdenTrust and VeriSign: First, it
was cross-signed by the intermediate IdenTrust ACES CA 1 which
roots back to DST ACES CA X6. Second, VeriSign cross-signed the
FPKI CA with its VeriSign Class 3 SSP Intermediate CA - G2, an
intermediate issued by VeriSigns internal XS-CertVeriSign Universal
Root. These cross-signs provided the FPKI with broad trust coverage
until the cross-signs expired or were revoked. VeriSigns cross-sign
expired in July 2016, shortly before the issuing VeriSign Class 3
SSP Intermediate CA - G2 was revoked by CA and vendor-specific
CRLs in 2017. IdenTrust revoked its cross-sign in February 2016,
but OneCRL did not inherit the CRL entry before November 2017.
Until revocation in 2015, a further trust path was provided via a
cross-sign by the Federal Bridge CA which was itself issued by the
already aforementioned DST ACES CA X6 [8].
The thus trusted Federal Bridge CA and Federal Bridge CA 2013
distributed the trust further by cross-signing the FPKI Federal Com-
mon Policy root. Between 2008 and 2011, a further trust path to DST
ACES CA X6 for this FPKI certificate was established by a cross-
sign from the root XS-Cert FBCA Common Policy. FBCA Common
Policy offers this path to DST ACES CA X6 via a cross-sign by FBCA
Entrust; additionally it is included in recent Apple root stores and
trusted by Microsoft (between 2012 and 2017). These trust paths
are also available for Federal Bridge CA 2013 which was (mutually)
cross-signed by FPKI Federal Common Policy. Further cross-signs
by Federal Bridge CA 2016 and U.S Department of State AD Root do
not provide new trust paths, however, as these have in return been
signed by FPKI Federal Common Policy, too, the broad trust also
expands to these intermediates.
Further cross-signs by FPKI Federal Common Policy expand the
IdenTrust and VeriSign trust path deeper in the FPKI: It cross-signed
the intermediate SHA-1 Federal Root CA; as likewise done by FBCA
Common Policy (providing an alternative path to DST ACES CA X6)
and, again, VeriSign Class 3 SSP Intermediate CA - G2. SHA-1 Federal
Root CA further signed the DoD Interoperability Root CA 1 which
repeatedly cross-signed the XS-Cert DoD Root CA2. However, in
contrast to the former XS-Certs, name constraint extensions limit
these cross-signs to issue for the U.S. Government only.
5.2.2 Cross-Signs of the Swiss Government. In 2016, the Swiss Gov-
ernment created the Swiss Government Public Trust Standard CA 02
intermediate which was cross-signed by QuoVadis Enterprise Trust
CA 2 G3 in 2017. Positively, QuoVadis used X509v3 Name Constraints
to white-list domains for which these cross-signs are allowed to
issue certificates. However, QuoVadis did not set the critical flag
for this extension, i.e., implementations are allowed to ignore it.
Consequently, the cross-signs could yield undesired trust paths for
software that does not implement X509v3 Name Constraints. This
especially could affect applications that derive trusted roots from
root stores of Mozilla, Google, or Apple as these do not establish a
valid path for the original intermediate (contrarily to Microsoft’s
root store). QuoVadis used its CRL to revoke the cross-signs in mid
2019, but only CRLSet adopted this revocation. The Swiss Govern-
ment did not misuse this opportunity: All 1,039 certificates observed
in our measurements are part of the white-listed domains.
Contrarily, Baltimore CyberTrust Root did not set up name con-
straints when it cross-signed Swiss Government SSL CA 01 (an in-
termediate issued in 2014 by Swiss Government Root CA II which
is included in Microsoft’s root store since 2016). Until its expiry in
2017, this cross-sign allowed the Swiss CA to issue certificates with
valid trust paths to all major root stores. In total, 756 certificates
validate under these circumstances; 9 of them are not part of the
white-listed domains, but still part of the Swiss top-level domain.
We describe three more cross-signs of state-controlled CAs when
discussing DigiCert in the light of ownership changes (Section 5.6.2).
Takeaway: Due to the extensive cross-signing in the FPKI, only
few trust anchors to the Web-PKI added many new trust paths. This
highlights the need for mechanisms that provide CAs with better
insight on the effect on trust paths before they cross-sign a certificate.
Furthermore, enforcing short validity periods for intermediates could
limit the impact of unexpected trust paths.
5.3 The Good: Bootstrapping of new CAs
In contrast to the previous cases which show security problems of
cross-signing, we now focus on the benefits of cross-signing. Espe-
cially for new CAs, inclusion into root stores is a lengthy process.
Obtaining a cross-sign from a broadly trusted root or intermediate
enables a CA to start its business while pursuing the process to
include certificates into root stores. In our dataset, we can iden-
tify such bootstrapping help for Let’s Encrypt, the China Internet
Network Information Center (CNNIC), and GoDaddy. Furthermore,
CyberTrust bootstrapped trust in Actalis Authentication CA G2
when Actalis’ root had not yet been trusted (cf. Section 5.1.3). We
provide a full list of involved CAs, e.g., COMODO, Digicert, WoSign,
Globalsign, AffirmTrust, and government CAs, in Appendix B.2.
5.3.1 Bootstrapping Let’s Encrypt. Let’s Encrypt launched as non-
profit Certificate Authority in 2015. It significantly increased the
amount of secured Internet communication by automating the cer-
tificate issuing process and providing certificates for free.
However, to provide this service early on, it had to depend on a
cross-sign by a widely trusted root for more than 5 years. Specifi-
cally, Let’s Encrypt will first start to default to its own ISRG Root
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starting September 29, 2020 [43]. Before, IdenTrust helped to boot-
strap trust for Let’s Encrypt. To this end, its DST Root CA X3 cross-
signed four intermediates originally issued by the ISRG Root X1, a
root of the Internet Security Research Group (ISRG) which man-
ages Let’s Encrypt. As ISRG Root X1 was initially not included in
root stores, IdenTrust was the sole trust anchor for Let’s Encrypt
certificates enabling a fast ramp up of the service [42].
Looking at the details, Let’s Encrypt uses four intermediate XS-
Certs. Let’s Encrypt Authority X1 and X2 are no more actively used
[42] (but not revoked and still valid until the end of 2020). In contrast
to newer cross-signs, IdenTrust prevents the X1 and X2 cross-signs
from issuing certificates for the top-level domain .mil. The more
recent Let’s Encrypt Authority X3 is currently used by Let’s Encrypt
to issue (leaf) certificates and remains valid until 2021-10 (original)
and 2021-03 (cross-sign). Finally, Let’s Encrypt Authority X4 serves
as backup, but will expire at the same time as X3.
Even after the switch to the own ISRG roots, the cross-signs will
be beneficial: Legacy clients that do not include the ISRG roots in
their root store can fall back to the IdenTrust trust path [42].
5.3.2 Entrust Helped CNNIC. Similar to Let’s Encrypt, the Chinese
CNNIC obtained bootstrapping help from an established CA; En-
trust.net Secure Server Certification Authority issued a CNNIC SSL
intermediate in 2007. Shortly after the inclusion of CNNIC ROOT
into root stores (e.g. 2009 for Mozilla [9]), the CNNIC ROOT cross-
signed this intermediate, creating an alternate trust path.
5.3.3 GoDaddy – Internal Bootstrapping via Subsidiary. Similarly,
GoDaddy used cross-signing to bootstrap trust into its CA certifi-
cates [7] when it entered the certificate business in 2004. In contrast
to the previous cases, however, it used an internal cross-sign. Par-
ticularly, GoDaddy started off with the root certificates GoDaddy
Class 2 CA and Starfield Class 2 CA and cross-signed them with
ValiCert’s root ValiCert Class 2 Policy Validation CA (created 1999).
Interestingly, GoDaddy acquired ValiCert just the year before, prob-
ably already preparing for its new business. Until its removal from
root stores around 2014, the ValiCert root thus bootstrapped trust
to Mozilla, Android, and Apple for the new certificates.
GoDaddy later bootstrapped a root for Amazon: When Amazon
created its Amazon Root CA 1 in 2015, an immediate cross-sign by
Starfield Services Root CA - G2 established trust right away whereas
it took years for Amazon’s root to arrive in root stores. E.g., Mozilla
and Google included it in 2017 and Apple even later in 2018.
Takeaway: Cross-Signing enables new CAs to already start their
business during the process of including their roots into root stores.
Without such a cross-sign, the long periods for inclusion and sufficient
propagation of root stores of several years could be prohibitive for new
companies in this business.
5.4 Expanding Trust and Alternative Paths
Any cross-sign either (i) expands the trust to more root stores, i.e.,
provides trust paths to not yet covered root stores, (ii) extends the
validity period in covered root stores, or (iii) adds alternative paths
to root stores already covered by other certificates in the XS-Cert. A
XS-Cert often causes several of (i)–(iii); Table 1 only counts them to
their primary case (i > ii > iii). We briefly describe some XS-Certs
in the following and refer to Appendix B.3 for further examples.
5.4.1 Expanding Trust. Some root certificates are not included in
all major root stores. We find that CAs broadly use cross-signs
to close these holes in the root-store coverage, enhancing their
trust. E.g., a cross-sign provides Entrust Root Certification Authority
- G2 with trust paths for Mozilla. Similarly, USERTrust cross-signed
AddTrust Qualified CA Root and AddTrust Class 1 CA Root to pro-
vide trust for Microsoft and the grid PKI. On the downside, as
aforementioned, these additional trust paths complicate certificate
revocations. Bootstrapping (cf. Section 5.3) is a special case of this
trust-expanding cross-signing. The count in Table 1 excludes boot-
strapping cases. Furthermore, we distinguish cases that extend only
the validity period. E.g., GlobalSign Domain Validation CA - SHA256
- G2 originally used trust paths via GlobalSign Root CA - R3, while a
cross-sign by GlobalSign Root CA extends the trust by several years.
5.4.2 Alternative Paths. Often, multiple certificates of a XS-Cert
provide valid paths to the same root store. This approach provides
fall-back trust: it proactively maintains alternative paths to deal
with unexpected revocations or removals. E.g., the intermediate XS-
Certs for Servision Inc., XiPS, and KAGOYA JAPAN Inc. – originally
issued by GoDaddy’s ValiCert Class 1 Policy Validation Authority –
were cross-signed by SECOM’s Security Communication RootCA1
in 2012. The cross-signs provided readily usable fall-back paths
when the originally issuing ValiCert certificate was removed from
Mozilla and Google root stores due to its 1024 bit RSA key [11, 12].
Note that most cross-signs establish alternative paths as issuing
CA certificates are often trusted in many root stores. The count
in Table 1 only lists XS-Certs whose sole outcome are alternative
paths, i.e., it includes only XS-Certs that do not expand the trust.
Takeaway: Cross-Signing enables large root store coverage if issu-
ing CAs span only a subset of root stores. Likewise, cross-signing can
provide alternative trust paths to proactively deal with CA revocations
and removals. Both ensures a non-disruptive user experience. However,
multiple trust paths for a certificate can also lead to incomplete revo-
cations and thus challenge the security of PKIs (cf. Section 5.1). Using
cross-signing for these purposes thus necessitates better mechanisms
to mitigate these security problems. We discuss possible solutions such
as better logging and limited lifetimes for XS-Certs in Section 6.
5.5 Cross-Signing Eases the Transition to New
Cryptographic Algorithms
Security guidelines by entities like the CAB Forum motivate CAs
to support advancements in cryptography early on, e.g., new sig-
nature algorithms. To maintain backward compatibility for legacy
implementations, CAs use cross-signs to establish alternative trust
paths that support new algorithms. Legacy clients that do not sup-
port the new algorithms can still use the old trust paths. We find
this happening commonly with intermediate XS-Certs. For root cer-
tificates this approach is not required - their self-signed signatures
are typically not checked by clients [10]. In these cases, the CA can
just issue a new intermediate that uses the new algorithms.
To give some examples, the Virginia Tech Global Qualified Server
CA intermediate was issued with a SHA1 signature by Trusted Root
CA G2 (GlobalSign) in 2012. In December 2014, i.e., approaching the
deadline for deprecating issuance based on SHA1 [37], GlobalSign
cross-signed the intermediate from the Trusted Root CA SHA256 G2.
The SHA1 intermediate was revoked in January 2017.
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Other intermediates switched to SHA2 long before the official
deprecation: The US Government (Common Policy) issued a SHA1
intermediate Betrusted Production SSP CA A1 in 2008 and created a
SHA256 cross-sign in 2010 using Federal Common Policy CA. The
SHA1 intermediate was revoked in 2011.
Actalis obtained a SHA1 cross-sign from Baltimore CyberTrust
Root for its SHA256 intermediate Actalis Authentication Root CA at
time of original issuance. Likewise, the Japanese Government issued
a cross-sign for ApplicationCA2 Sub to provide parallel support for
SHA1 and SHA256 on creation of the intermediate in 2013.
Keynectis cross-signed its intermediate KEYNECTIS Extended
Validation CAwith roots of its subsidiaries Certplus (Class 2 Primary
CA) and OpenTrust (OpenTrust CA for AATL G1). The cross-signs
offer SHA1, SHA256, SHA512 and ECDSA-with-SHA384 signatures.
Takeaway: Cross-signing can establish new trust paths that fully
support new cryptographic algorithms. This enables state-of-the-art
clients to achieve better security but at the same time maintains
backward compatibility for legacy clients which validate the same
certificate with the help of older paths. We expect CAs to put similar
backward compatibility procedures in place once the use of a succes-
sor for SHA2, like SHA3, becomes popular. However, we posit that
backward compatibility should be kept for a limited time only—using
short certificate validity periods—to push application developers to
support state-of-the-art cryptography.
5.6 Effect of Ownership-Changes on XS-Certs
In this section, we analyze the effect of CA acquisitions on existing
cross-signs. Cross-signs, especially across organizations, add con-
tractual obligations—and necessitate trust granting CAs to check
the actions of CAs they cross-signed. Thus, we are interested if new
owners revoke cross-signs that were created by acquired CAs. Sim-
ilarly, we are interested if cross-signs are revoked once the owner
of a cross-signed CA changes.
5.6.1 Cross-Signs Outlive Ownership-Changes. The Network Solu-
tions Certificate Authority root has been repeatedly cross-signed by
members of Comodo’s trust network. This process spanned several
ownership changes. The original root was created 2006. At this
time, Network Solutions had been owned by Pivotal Equity for
three years. In the same year, Comodo’s UTN-USERFirst-Hardware
cross-signed the root twice. After Network Solutions was sold to
General Atlantic, Comodo’sAddTrust External CA Root cross-signed
the certificate in 2010. Furthermore, we find a cross-sign by Ad-
dTrust: this intermediate has been valid since 2000—when Network
Solutions was owned by VeriSign—but it likely was backdated (cf.
Section 5.7.1). All these cross-sings outlived the acquisition of Net-
work Solutions by web.com in 2011 and remain valid until 2020,
thus spanning at least two ownership changes.
We also find cases in which the CAs that issue cross-sign cer-
tificates changed owners. When Digicert created the DigiCert High
Assurance EV Root CA in 2006, it was cross-signed by Entrust.net Se-
cure Server Certificate Authority and Entrust.net Certificate Authority.
3 years later, Thoma Bravo acquired Entrust and sold it to Datacard
in 2013, which rebranded it to Entrust Datacard. Despite these own-
ership changes, the cross-signs of Digicert’s root remained valid
(until 2014 and 2015), making the new owners responsible for trust
paths of certificates issued by DigiCert9. This raises the question
if the new owners were aware of the cross-signs - and decided to
keep them, or if they simply were not aware of their existence.
5.6.2 DigiCert – Internal Islands and External Legacy Cross-Signing.
In the DigiCert group, most XS-Certs were created before DigiCert
acquired the corresponding CAs. Thus, we predominantly find
internal cross-signs within each subsidiary and only few cross-signs
across DigiCert subsidiaries. Most cross-signs originate from times
of VeriSign, Verizon, and QuoVadis. DigiCert only occasionally used
the acquired certificates to cross-sign its own DigiCert roots.
When acquiring Verizon in 2015, DigiCert also became respon-
sible for external XS-Certs. First, Verizon cross-signed root certifi-
cates of WellsFargo in 2013 and 2015. All corresponding intermedi-
ates were revoked by the CA’s CRL and Mozilla’s OneCRL in 2017,
when the roots were removed from all root stores (after request by
WellsFargo [15]), except for Apple. Similarly, Verizon cross-signed
Certipost E-Trust Primary Normalized CA providing this former only
Microsoft-trusted root a broad trust coverage.
Verizon also cross-signed state-controlled CAs which is poten-
tially problematic (cf. Section 5.2). In 2010 and 2013, it cross-signed
the Swiss Government root, increasing its trust beyond Apple and
Microsoft. Similarly, it cross-signed the Belgium Root CA2 and Por-
tugal’s SCEE ECRaizEstado–some of them were later revoked in
2018 due to a series of misissuances [21]. The acquisition of Verizon
made Digicert responsible for these cross-signs of state-controlled
CAs. Thus, cross-signs did not only provide state-controlled CAs
with large trust coverage, but these cross-signs also faced ownership
changes which increase the risk for unnoticed problems.
We describe further XS-Certs with ownership changes and pro-
vide details on Digicert’s cross-signs in Appendix B.5.
Takeaway: Considering the frequent cross-signs across CAs, po-
tential new owners must—before acquiring a CA—review existing
issued and received cross-signs and corresponding obligations. Sim-
ilarly, cross-signing CAs must be informed when a cross-signed CA
changes its owner. Both requires an easily accessible and verifiable
store of XS-Certs as we suggest in Section 6.
5.7 The Ugly: Potentially Problematic Practices
and Missing Transparency
In this section, we highlight practices of CAs that—while not ex-
plicitly forbidden—are frowned upon by root store maintainers [67]
or make it hard to assess the legitimacy of existing trust.
5.7.1 Backdating of Cross-signs. Comodo’s AddTrust External CA
Root backdates several cross-signs, i.e., it sets the not before field
to a date several years before the actual issuance. We used crt.sh
to verify that the early not before dates are not caused by re-issued
root certificates. Backdating is explicitly forbidden if it bypasses a
root store policy that relies on information in the not before field—
like the deprecation of SHA-1 signatures for new certificates [37].
Mozilla lists backdating as problematic practice [67] as backdating
can interfere with future policies (cf. not before rules, Section 5.1.1).
The USERTrust ECC Certification Authority root (valid since 2010)
was cross-signed by AddTrust External CA Root in 2013 [20] using
9Note that Thoma Bravo was not in control of Digicert and Entrust at the same time.
Thoma Bravo acquired Digicert in 2015, two years after selling Entrust to Datacard.
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a not before date of 2000. Other cross-signs of the root use more
accurate times, e.g., a cross-sign by AAA Certificate Services in 2019.
We find further cross-signs by AddTrust which we believe to
be backdated as their not before date precedes that of the cross-
signed root by several years. We lack clear evidence, but signs
for a reoccurring backdating behavior of the CA are present: All
presumably backdated cross-signs are issued by AddTrust External
CA Root using not before dates from 2000 or 2010. Specifically, the
cross-signs of COMODO Certification Authority, COMODO ECC
Certification Authority COMODO RSA Certification Authority, and
USERTrust RSA Certification Authority list not before dates from
2000 whereas the corresponding roots list dates from 2006, 2008
and 2010. Cross-signs of the Network Solutions Certificate Authority,
a root created in 2006, list dates from 2000 and 2010.
Finally, we find StartCom to set not before to 2006 (correspond-
ing to the original root) when cross-signing StartCom Certification
Authority whereas the cross-signing StartCom Certificate Authority
G2 is valid only since 2010. This case is only a problematic practice
and no strict violation of the policy. However, it is noteworthy that
StartCom already backdated certificates long before the incidents
that led to the removal of trust in WoSign and StartCom. That deci-
sion was partly based on their violation of policies by backdating
certificates to circumvent SHA1 deprecation (cf. Section 5.1).
5.7.2 Missing Insight for Partly Disabled Comodo Root XS-Certs.
Comodo requested the exclusion of some root certificates from root
stores, but kept their cross-signs valid. Specifically, the root certifi-
cates of USERTrust UTN-USERFirst-Hardware and AddTrust Class 1
CA Root were removed from the root stores of Firefox and Android
in 2017 as they are no longer in use [16]. However, corresponding
cross-signs by UTN-USERFirst-Client Authentication and Email (also
trusted by Firefox and Android) have not been revoked as they
are still in use. Especially the USERTrust UTN-USERFirst-Hardware
cross-sign is still heavily used after the withdrawal of its root: We
find valid trust paths for 4,244,104 leaf and 276 CA certificates until
2020. We note that, from everything we can tell, this is—in this
case—desired behavior and not malicious. It shows, however, that it
is hard to tell for an outside observer if cross-signs just have been
forgotten - or are purposefully kept active.
The removal (and eventual revocation) of USERTrust UTN - DAT-
ACorp SGC is a counterexample. It was removed from Firefox and
Android root stores in 2015 due to a planned removal of public trust
by the owner [13, 14]. After additional request by the owner, the in-
termediates were revoked by adding them toMozilla’s OneCRL [14].
The need for an additional request shows the complexity of revo-
cations in face of cross-signs. In our opinion, the original removal
request should already have raised questions on the revocation of
the cross-signs. Instead, this required an explicit additional request
by the owner—which only happened about 3 months later.
Takeaway: The backdating of certificates might be tempting, e.g.,
to match the validity periods of the original certificate. However, back-
dating is a problematic behavior that hides the issuance date of a
certificate without providing benefits. On top of this, cross-signing
adds a new problem: The legitimacy of an incomplete revocation is
hard to assess as corresponding information is typically unavailable.
To achieve transparency, evaluating cross-signs and requesting infor-
mation about them should be an integral part of revocation processing.
XS-Certs in the Wild – Summary: While cross-signing com-
plicates the PKI, CAs also use it to adopt more secure cryptography
while maintaining compatibility with legacy software. In the follow-
ing, we propose several changes with the goal of establishing secure
cross-signing practices and making cross-signs comprehensible.
6 DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CAs depend on cross-signing. For example, the fast tremendous
success of Let’s Encrypt would not have been possible without
bootstrapping the CA through cross-signing, and also GoDaddy
started with a cross-sign. Cross-signing also enables CAs to issue
certificates with new, more secure cryptographic algorithms while
maintaining compatibility with legacy applications—as it happened
with the SHA1 to SHA256 transition. Cross-signing can be used to
increase root-store coverage by establishing paths to different root
stores—even in face of differing root store policies and resulting
diverging root store setups. Cross-signing can pro-actively set up
alternative trust paths based on other CA certificates such that end-
user certificates still validate. Thus, cross-signing is a beneficial
mechanism for the PKI ecosystem.
Yet, cross-signing complicates certificate handling and intro-
duces new problems, some concerning the management of cross-
signs. For an observer it is hard to tell if cross-signs intentionally
or unknowingly outlive CA owner-ship changes (see Section 5.6.1).
Problematic practices like backdating of certificates [67] further
complicate the assessment of existing cross-signs. The by most
important problem are undesired trust-paths caused by cross-signs.
While revocation of CA certificates already is a complicated process,
necessitating software updates and/or updates of vendor-specific
CRLs, cross-signs make this process even more complex—and led
to numerous incomplete revocations as shown in Section 5.1. New
cross-signs need careful examination to make sure that they do not
accidentally extend the trust of a CA, or span trust across PKIs.
Cross-sign revocations are a hard to solve problem for applica-
tion software. For example, all major browsers and Microsoft use
their own systems to propagate CA revocation information. This
revocation information is, however, not easily accessible for many
applications. A typical Unix program that uses OpenSSL or NSS has
no easy way to get revocation information. It will typically blindly
trust all CA certificates that it encounters—no matter if it was re-
voked. The same is true for mobile applications on iOS and OSX.
Even on Microsoft Windows one will only get access to some revo-
cation information—and only when using the operating system’s
APIs. Many applications, however, chose to use OpenSSL even on
Windows—e.g., through using the popular libcurl [52]. Program-
ming languages like Go and Java also have their own validation
logic and will thus not get revocation information [75].
Thus, cross-signing puts the security and privacy of users at
risk: It can undermine the security of one of the most critical in-
frastructures in a digitally interconnected world, which—for better
or worse—is the current trust backbone for nearly all secure com-
munication on the Internet.
In the following, we suggest best practices preserving the bene-
fits of cross-signing while limiting future security problems (Sec-
tions 6.1 and 6.6) and ensuring awareness of CAs as well as giving
more transparency to the user (Sections 6.2–6.5). Automated checks
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can hint at violations of these practices, but—like for many rules set
up by root store maintainers—manual inspection is often necessary.
6.1 Limit Problems using Short Validities
Typically, cross-signs have validity periods ranging from several
years up to several decades. As a result, security issues often remain
problematic for years—especially for applications that do not use
revocation information.
To limit the impact of security incidents related to cross-signing,
we suggest CAs to limit the maximum validity period of cross-signs.
The benefits of shorter validity periods have been discussed, e.g.,
in [25, 90]. Applications that lack access to revocation information
will benefit greatly from this change—there is a much smaller win-
dow of opportunity for exploitation after a CA certificate should
have been revoked. Continuous renewals of CA certificates will
also limit the validity of cross-sign to the term during which a
business relationship between two entities is ongoing—such cross-
signs cannot just be forgotten after an ownership change. Short
validity periods for cross-signs should not pose an insurmount-
able problem for CAs: Increasing automation of certificate issuance
and renewal—especially advanced by Let’s Encrypt in the recent
years—already enables the deployment and update of short-living
leaf certificates on end-user systems like webservers. Let’s Encrypt
already defaults to a 3-month validity period for leaf certificates.
Our proposal also matches current industry trends: Mozilla, Google,
and Apple already announced to limit the maximum validity period
of leaf certificates to 398 days (1 year + grace period) [51, 83, 95]. To
lessen the impact of problems even more, validity periods should be
reduced to about 4 days [25, 90] and—as underlined by our findings—
also apply to CA certificates [90]. This would necessitate all CAs to
adopt automation similarly to Let’s Encrypt.
A more invasive and less preferable approach could be to couple
a long-living cross-sign with short-lived proofs of freshness pro-
vided by the cross-signing CA. Whenever the certificate is used, the
receiver checks if the proof of freshness is recent. These freshness
proofs can be distributed by the webserver in the TLS handshake
using OCSP stapling—which can be mandated by the certificate
using the OCSP Must-Staple extension [44, 76]. However, OCSP
Must-Staple does not provide the necessary deployment at CAs,
servers, or clients [25, 27]. Thus, short validity periods—which do
not require specific client support [25, 90]—are preferable.
6.2 Shedding Light on Cross-Sign Motivations
Our analysis also shows good and positive use cases for cross-
signing. However, CAs are not required to state their motivation
for a particular cross-sign, although this motivation is important
for assessing if a cross-sign (still) serves a benign purpose or should
be revoked. For example, a bootstrapping cross-sign can be revoked
when the original root has reached the desired trust coverage. Sim-
ilarly, a cross-sign that improves root store coverage should be
revoked when the original CA certificate is no longer used. To shed
light on the motivation and enable corresponding checks, we sug-
gest requiring CAs to encode the motivation(s) for a cross-sign as a
new XS extension in the resulting certificate as follows.
Bootstrapping. The XS extension should encode a reference to
the bootstrapped certificate as well as the targeted root stores of the
bootstrapping. A corresponding pending request for inclusion of
the certificate into the root store must exist—root store maintainers
can provide a proof. The cross-sign must not be renewed any longer
when the bootstrapped certificate is trusted by the targeted stores.
Expanding Trust. A cross-sign that expands the trust should en-
code the corresponding stores in its XS extension. Such a certificate
must only exist if no other certificate of the XS-Cert provides a valid
path to the targeted root store (except for paths that are flagged
as alternative, see below). To limit the impact of coincidentally re-
sulting alternative paths by the cross-sign, applications may ignore
cross-signs that intend to expand the trust to only other root stores
than the store used by the application.
Fall-Back paths.While fall-back paths increase the complexity
of the PKI, they can be necessary to, e.g., support legacy devices
using old versions of trust-stores with old root certificates. Fall-back
cross-signs should encode the targeted root stores and the current
certificate they are a fall-back for. We posit that software that ships
with up-to-date root stores that get updated regularly should ignore
all fall-back certificates. As we describe, other cross-sign use cases
must prove that they do not serve the sole purpose to create fall-
back paths—via verifiable information in the XS extension.
Multiple Algorithms. When providing support for new (signa-
ture) algorithms, the cross-sign must—upon issuance—establish a
valid path to a root store using the desired algorithms only. No
other certificate should provide a valid path to the root store using
these algorithms, except for fall-back paths (see above). To enable
checks of this condition, the XS extension should encode the set of
algorithms which are used to validate the new path; it should also
encode the other CA certificates for this path.
Creation time. In addition to the XS-extension, all newly issued
CA certificates should include signed timestamps of several CT logs.
These can serve as indicator for the time of issuance (rather than
the easily manipulatable not before field).
6.3 Ownership Change: Report on Cross-Signs
As our analysis in Section 5.6 shows, cross-signs typically outlive
ownership changes of involved CAs. However, the public remains
unaware if this is an explicit decision. We suggest providing trans-
parency and raising the awareness for cross-signs when owners
change. To this end, when the owner of a cross-sign changes, the
issuers of the cross-sign should be required to publicly declare if
the cross-sign should remain valid. Likewise, the new owner should
publicly acknowledge that it will adhere to the obligations that arise
from the possession of the cross-sign. We envision such statements
to become a mandatory part of the report on CA ownership change
that is already required by root stores [63]. Incomplete statements
on affected cross-signs would justify revocations and challenge the
trustworthiness of the misbehaving CAs.
6.4 Explain Revocation Inconsistencies
We uncover several revocation inconsistencies for XS-Certs (cf.
Sections 5.1.3 and 5.7.2). However, it is sometimes unclear if these
inconsistencies are accidental—or desired. To enable root store
maintainers and researchers to correctly classify these cases, CAs
should be required to pro-actively explain revocation inconsisten-
cies of XS-Certs—and explain their purpose to allow for the setup
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of checks (cf. Section 6.2). This information can nicely extend the
existing best practice to explain the reason for a revocation in CRLs.
6.5 Enable Easy Access to Cross-Signs
Easy access to cross-signing information would significantly help
to ensure that cross-signs are (still) legitimate. Certificate Trans-
parency (CT) already aims at making certificate information avail-
able to everyone [55]. CT provides semi-trusted append-only public
log-servers with the goal to contain all currently trusted certificates
in the Internet—and it is well on the way to satisfying this goal [82].
CT is, however, not easily searchable and fragmented in lots of
servers. Due to scalability problems, this fragmentation will likely
increase in the future [82]. Thus, current CT practices do not ensure
a great fit of CT for the evaluation of cross-signs.
Fragmentation of certificates to different CT logs complicates the
search for cross-signs since they can be distributed across different
logs. We suggest requiring CAs to report all certificates of a XS-Cert
to the same CT log(s). This ensures that a single CT log can provide
full information on the cross-signing properties of a certificate. To
account for the high impact of root and intermediate XS-Certs, CAs
should be required to report all CA certificates to a set of CT logs
that only log CA certificates. These CT logs can provide fast and
complete statements on the cross-signing properties of CA certifi-
cates. Due to the limited amount of CA certificates, they should
remain small—and not require a huge infrastructure commitment.
6.6 Use Vendor-Controlled CRLs by Default
In Section 5.1, we show the importance of revocation information
for intermediate certificates. We also highlight that, for the most
part, only large webbrowsers get this revocation information—via
vendor-specific CRLs. This, however, opens a potential window of
attack on all other applications which lack a sufficiently simple way
to get this revocation information [74].
We propose that a new standard system for the revocation of
certificates should be created—which could be equivalent to ei-
ther OneCRL or CRLSets. This system should be supported out-of-
the-box by typical operating systems and SSL/TLS libraries (like
OpenSSL). It should not necessitate any changes in applications
using TLS. TrustBase [74] could be a candidate. Further, recent re-
search shows the applicability of local revocation lists like OneCRL
even for an efficient revocation of leaf certificates [54]. Making
such approaches the default would significantly improve the safety
and robustness of the whole Web PKI.
7 RELATEDWORK
While there is a large body of work that examines different facets
of the PKI [2, 46, 56, 81, 87] as well as the TLS and the HTTPS
ecosystem [34, 48], most studies do not mention or examine cross-
signing. In their 2013 Systematization of Knowledge paper, Clark
and Oorschot give a thorough review of the issues of the Web
PKI [28]. In this paper, the authors already note the problem of
revoking CA certificates. They also mention that CA certificates
may not even contain the necessary information for revocation
checking. One of the first studies of the HTTPS ecosystems per-
formed by Durumeric et al. already noted a high occurrence of
cross-signing among CA certificates in 2013 [35]. However, their
analysis is limited to an overview on the occurrence of general
cross-signing and a very brief statement on effect on root store
coverage without any further analysis. Acer et al. [1] analyzed
the causes for certificate validation errors encountered by Chrome
users during web browsing. They find that missing cross-sign cer-
tificates in a presented certificate path cause some errors and thus
acknowledge the importance of cross-signing as means to root trust
in widely trusted stores. Roosa et al. [80] identified cross-signing as
one of the mechanisms that cause intransparency in PKI systems
as CAs do not disclose cross-sign relationships when applying for
inclusion in a root store. Only since April 2018, CAs must report all
intermediates that provide a path to a root in Mozilla’s root store
and are not constrained to specific domain subtrees [60, 61]. Ca-
sola et al. [24] enable CAs to automatically check the compatibility
of their policies before cross-signing. We highlight problems beyond
policies and provide guidelines for a safe operation of cross-signs.
There is a large amount of work that examines different aspects
of certificate revocation. Most studies, however, concentrate on the
revocation of end-host certificates and do not detail the impact of
revocation of intermediates or the interaction with cross-signing.
Liu et al. measure certificate revocation in the Web PKI [58]. While
they mention the importance of revoking intermediate certificates,
their study only measures leaf-certificate revocations.
8 CONCLUSION
Our longitudinal study shows that cross-signing is a common prac-
tice in theWeb PKI.We provide a classification of possible cross-sign
patterns and analyze their use in and their effect on real world com-
munications. We show that cross-signs are used to bootstrap trust
in new CAs—which played a significant role in the tremendous
success of Let’s Encrypt. Cross-signs also lead to better trust-store
coverage, giving CAs trust in stores they are not directly trusted
in. Finally, cross-signing allows for a graceful transition to newer
cryptographic algorithms like done in the case of SHA-2.
However, our work also highlights the problems that cross-
signing introduces to PKIs, the largest being unwanted trust paths.
Cross-signing complicates the already error-prone revocation pro-
cesses of certificates. It led to numerous incomplete revocations.
We also show that introducing new cross-signs requires extensive
checks to prevent accidental PKI boundary breaches. Cross-signing
also makes it hard for observers to determine if trust paths are
legitimate—or just forgotten artifacts of past contractual relation-
ships between CAs.
Based on the gathered insights, we propose new cross-signing
best practices. It is our hope to initiate and steer the discussion for
new rules that preserve the beneficial potential of cross-signing but
mitigate its risks.
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A ETHICS OF DATA COLLECTION
The passive data collection effort that we perform has been cleared
by the respective responsible parties at each contributing institution
before they begin contributing. Our data-collection effort generally
leverages the already existing network security monitoring infras-
tructure at the contributing institutions: the data collection effort
is generally run by the network security teams of the contributing
institutions on their already existing network monitoring platforms.
We just provide them with a short script (which they can examine)
that performs the TLS data extraction.
This script only extracts data that is not privacy sensitive - or
anonymizes it before the data is sent to us. For example, it does
not include the client IP address. Instead, the data that we are sent
contains a seeded hash of the concatenation of the client and the
server IP addresses. The seed is site-specific and unknown to us.
This approach allows us to determine when the same client
connects to the same server repeatedly (e.g. to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of session resumption), without enabling us to track which
sites a single client accesses.
Moreover, note that we also do not include client-certificates in
our data collection; we only collect certificates that Internet servers
send to clients.
B DETAILS AND FURTHER EXAMPLES
In the following, we detail some already presented XS-Certs and
provide further examples for some cross-signing categories.
B.1 WoSign & StartCom: Early Cross-Signing
As briefly noted in Section 5.1.1, StartCom started cross-signing
WoSign certificates years before being acquired by them and cross-
signing continued after the acquisition. Specifically, StartCom Cer-
tificate Authority cross-signed the Certification Authority of WoSign
in 2006, but revoked the cross-signs in March 2017. However, a
further cross-sign of WoSign CA Limited was not revoked before
2018. StartCom also issued the intermediate WoSign eCommerce
Services Limited, which was cross-signed by Certplus later on, in
2011 (cf. Section 5.1.1). These cross-signs do not yield undesired
trust paths since the StartCom roots were constrained by Mozilla’s
and Google’s not before constraints. However, they show a close
business relationship between StartCom and WoSign years before
the (not timely reported) acquisition of StartCom by WoSign in
2015.
This behavior continued after the acquisition: StartCom Certi-
fication Authority issued and Certification Authority of WoSign G2
cross-signed the new intermediate StartCom Class 3 OV Server CA.
B.2 Bootstrapping: Further Examples
Cross-signing enables CAs to bootstrap trust in certificates while
waiting for their inclusion in root stores. We discussed several cases
in Section 5.3. In the following, we provide the full list of CAs for
which we identified bootstrapping cases. In our dataset, we found
bootstrapping cases for Comodo, USERTrust, DigiCert, VeriSign,
Verizon, Cybertrust, Let’s Encrypt, IdenTrust, WoSign, AffirmTrust,
GlobalSign, Actalis, Starfield Services, Amazon, T-Systems, WellsSe-
cure, Dell Inc., SECOM, TeliaSonera, Unizeto, CertiPath, Certipost,
SCEE, Chunghwa Telecom, Carillon Information Security Inc., ORC
PKI, TAIWAN-CA.COM Inc., Hongkong Post ARGE DATEN - Aus-
trian Society for Data Protection, CNNIC, the U.S. Government, the
Swiss Government, and the Belgium Root.
B.3 Expanding Trust and Alternative Paths:
Further Examples and Comodo Details
As noted in Section 5.4, some root certificates are included in only
some root stores. Consequently, a single issuer may provide only
limited trust. Cross-signs by selected CA certificates can close these
holes by providing trust paths to uncovered root stores.
B.3.1 Increasing Trust Store Coverage. We find three XS-Certs that
use cross-signing to increase their root store coverage. The interme-
diate XS-Certs Servision Inc., XiPS and KAGOYA JAPAN Inc. were
issued by GoDaddy’s ValiCert Class 1 Policy Validation Authority in
2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively. The ValiCert certificate provides
trust paths for Mozilla, Google, and Apple, but not for Microsoft’s
root store. To expand the root store coverage, all three intermediates
were cross-signed by the broadly trusted Security Communication
RootCA1 of SECOM end of 2012, which validated issued certificates
for the Microsoft ecosystem, too.
Furthermore, the ValiCert root was removed from the root stores
of Mozilla and Google around 2014 and 2015 due to the deprecation
of certificates that use RSA keys with less than 2048 bit [11, 12].
The intermediates, however, remained trusted due to the cross-sign
by SECOM. The same holds for Apple’s root store when it removed
the ValiCert root in 2018. Thus, cross-signing can not only provide
a broad trust coverage but also keeps intermediates operable in the
face of trust-store removals of their issuers.
Unizeto did not only cross-sign WoSign roots (cf. Section 5.1.1),
but also provided SSL.com with trust on Apple devices. Specifically,
Certum Trusted Network CA cross-signed the roots SSL.com Root
CA RSA and SSL.com RV Root CA RSA R2. Both roots, while created
2016 and 2017, respectively, were not included in root stores before
2018. The cross-signs by Certum in 2018 extended trust to Apple’s
root store which did not include the roots before 2019.
B.3.2 Fall-Back Trust Paths. Cross-signs that increase the root
store coverage often also establish fall-back trust paths which proac-
tively provide alternatives for unexpected revocations. Specifically,
the SECOM cross-sign (Section B.3.1) provided trust paths for cer-
tificates of Servision, XiPS, and KAGOYA JAPAN after the originally
issuing ValiCert certificate was removed from Mozilla and Google
root stores due to its 1024 bit RSA key [11, 12].
Also Entrust maintains a small internal cross-signing intercon-
nection to establish fall-back trust paths for already broadly trusted
roots: Entrust.net Secure Server Certificate Authority cross-signed
Entrust.net Certificate Authority and Entrust Root Certificate Au-
thority. The latter furthermore cross-signed Entrust Root Certificate
Authority - G2 and Entrust Root Certificate Authority - EC1. Beyond
these internal cross-signs, Entrust also received external cross-signs
by today’s members of the Digicert group (cf. Sections B.5.2).
Apart from its cross-signing to bootstrap new roots (cf. Sec-
tion 5.3.3), GoDaddy also maintains internal XS-Certs which es-
tablish alternative trust paths for already well trusted roots. In
2009, the bootstrapped Starfield Class 2 CA cross-signed Starfield
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Figure 4: Internal cross-signing in the Comodo/Sectigo group.
Services Root Certificate Authority - G2. Starfield Services Root Cer-
tificate Authority added another cross-sign to this root XS-Cert. In
2014, Starfield Class 2 CA also cross-signed Starfield Root Certificate
Authority - G2. Similarly in 2014, Go Daddy Class 2 Certification
Authority cross-signed Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2, es-
tablishing alternative trust paths. Beyond these internal cross-signs,
Go Daddy’s ValiCert Class 1 Policy Validation cross-signed SECOM
Security Communication Root CA1, again establishing fall-back trust
paths for an already well-trusted root.
Also GlobalSign creates fall-back trust paths via cross-signing.
Besides its incompletely revoked XS-Cert GlobalSign Extended Vali-
dation CA - SHA256 - G2 (cf. Section 5.1.3), GlobalSign maintains
four still valid cross-signs: AlphaSSL CA - SHA256 - G2, GlobalSign
Organization Validation CA - SHA256 - G2, GlobalSign Domain Val-
idation CA - SHA256 - G2, and GlobalSign CloudSSL CA - SHA256
- G3. The two cross-signing roots GlobalSign Root CA and Global-
Sign provide broad trust coverage everyone for itself; hence the
cross-signs establish alternative paths.
B.3.3 Comodo’s Trust-Enlarging and Fall-Back Cross-Signs. Co-
modo extensively uses cross-signing to interlink root certificates
within and between its subsidiary CAs as we visualize in Figure 4.
Still, this interlinking is established by only a few certificates which
cross-sign several others. Especially the broadly trusted AddTrust
External CA Root cross-signed various root certificates of USERTrust
and Comodo, establishing fall-back trust paths for them. Almost
all these cross-signs also enlarge the root store coverage, compen-
sating for a limited root store coverage of the cross-signed root.
This effect is especially large for USERTRUST UTN-USERFirst-Client
Authentication and USERTrust UTN-USERFirst-Object as it adds trust
paths for Mozilla, Android, and the grid PKI beyond the original
coverage of only iOS, OSX, and Microsoft. Contrarily, COMODO
ECC Certification Authority and COMODO RSA Certification Au-
thority merely obtain new trust by the grid PKI. Nevertheless, they
still profit from the fall-back trust paths. Before USERTrust UTN-
USERFirst-Hardware and USERTrust UTN - DATACorp SGC ceased
their operation, their mutual cross-signs with AddTrust External CA
Root also provided the latter with fall-back trust paths — which nat-
urally expanded to all its cross-signs. Similarly, the broadly trusted
AAA Certificate Services root10 cross-signed three USERTrust roots
providing each with a further fall-back trust path.
Also Comodo’s intermediate XS-Certs COMODO EV SSL CA and
COMODO EV SGC CA profit from fall-back trust paths established
through cross-signing. Comodo’s very first intermediate XS-Cert,
however, is LiteSSL CA which Comodo created for Positive Software
Corporation after acquiring it in 2005.
B.4 Switching Trust Anchor
The expiry of or changing trust in certificates requires CAs to
establish new trust paths to keep affected but still trustworthy
certificates valid. For example, if the issuing certificate will soon
expire, the owner of an intermediate may request a different CA
to issue a longer lasting intermediate with the same subject and
public key. Remember that we require certificates of a cross-sign to
overlap by at least 121 days (cf. Section 3.1) and otherwise consider
it as re-issuance. However, some trust changes happen years before
expiry of the original certificates:
Symantec’s GeoTrust Global CA issued an intermediate for Uni-
Credit in 2012 and renewed it in 2015. In October 2016, Actalis
cross-signed this certificate. However, the older GeoTrust issued
certs were revoked the day after this issuance, rendering this to a
switch to a new root rather than a typical cross-sign.
Similarly, The Spanish Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofe-
sional CIF A62634068 moved from a soon expiring to a more recent
root.
Also Sertifitseerimiskeskus (SK), which is the partner of Estonia
for id products, used cross-signing to switch its AS Sertifitseerim-
iskeskus root (expiring in 2016) to the new EE Certification Centre
10 The subject AAA Certificate Services is used for a root certificate but also for an
unrelated intermediate XS-Cert, i.e., the latter uses a different private key.
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Figure 5: Root XS-Certs of Digicert and its subsidiaries: Cross-signs created prior to acquisition by Digicert form islands.
Root CA. Interestingly, the cross-sign does include a SHA3 inter-
mediate since 2015 but no cross-sign with SHA2, limiting clients
without SHA3 capabilities to the use of a SHA1 trust path element.
B.5 Ownership Changes: Further Examples
and Digicert Details
In Section 5.6, we showed that cross-signs frequently outlive owner-
ship changes which may lead missing awareness of the cross-signs
and overseen problems. We provide further examples and a detailed
view on the Digicert cases in the following.
B.5.1 Entrust Datacard. Entrust Datacard is another example with
cross-signs that span an ownership change: In 2016, Entrust Dat-
acard obtained control of Affirmtrust Networking and Affirmtrust
Commercial which were cross-signed by SwissSign Gold CA - G2
in 2009. The cross-signs for Affirmtrust Networking were revoked
more than a year later due to a double-use of the serial number [17].
In contrast, the Affirmtrust Commercial cross-sign was revoked
only several months before it’s expiry in 2019. The corresponding
root certificates, however, remain trusted.
B.5.2 Digicert Details. In Section 5.6.2, we outlined that Digicert
inherited most of its cross-signs when acquiring CAs. We provide
the details on these cross-signs in the following.
In the Digicert group, most XS-Certs were created before the cor-
responding CAswere acquired by Digicert. Thus, we predominantly
find cross-signs between certificates of the same subsidiary and
only very few cross-signs across Digicert subsidiaries as we illus-
trate in Figure 5. Most cross-signs originate from times of VeriSign,
Verizon, and QuoVadis with Digicert only adding cross-signs among
its own Digicert roots.
VeriSign cross-signed four of its own roots (VeriSign Class 3 Public
Primary Certification Authority - G3, G4, G5, and VeriSign Universal
Root Certification Authority), but also accounts for the cross-sign of
thawte Primary Root CA. Similarly, GeoTrust Primary Certification
Authority, which started out of Equifax’ security business, was
cross-signed during the VeriSign ownership. Only GeoTrust Global
CA was already cross-signed when still owned by Equifax. After
acquiring VeriSign as part of Symantec in 2017, Digicert only used
its control over VeriSign roots to cross-sign DigiCert Global Root
G2 with VeriSign Class 3 Public Primary Certification Authority - G5.
Otherwise, it only retained the existing cross-signs. We also find an
external cross-sign that was created by VeriSign, but it did not last
until the owner change to Symantec: When Thawte was owned
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by VeriSign, Thawte Server cross-signed Entrust.net Secure Server
Certificate Authority. After expiry of these intermediates in 2003,
Thawte did not renew the cross-sign, however, Entrust obtained a
cross-sign by the Digicert-controlled GTE CyberTrust Global Root
in 2004.
Also most intermediate XS-Certs in the Digicert group were
created by VeriSign or Symantec before Digicert obtained control
over these CAs. Specifically, VeriSign created four intermediate
XS-Certs for Thawte as well as three for itself. After acquiring
VeriSign, Symantec, which did not cross-sign any of its roots, further
created 3 intermediate XS-Certs for its own CA name. Only one
further Symantec intermediate XS-Cert was created by Digicert
after its acquisition. Only two (three) months after the cross-signing
(acquisition), Digicert revoked all certificates of this latter XS-Cert,
but otherwise kept the old intermediate XS-Certs active.
A cross-sign of QuoVadis which already existed when it was
acquired by WiSeKey in 2017 survived as an isolated island within
the Digicert group.
Beyond these scope-wise limited cross-signing, Verizon had nu-
merous internal and external cross-signs which became part of the
Digicert group when it acquired the Verizon and CyberTrust roots
from Verizon. Internally, Verizon established multiple cross-signs
across CyberTrust roots, and a Verizon root cross-sign (cf. Figure 5).
Digicert only used Baltimore CyberTrust Root to cross-sign DigiCert
Global Root CA and DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA. The lat-
ter was additionally cross-signed by GTE CyberTrust Global Root
and DigiCert Transition RSA Root (and Entrust.net Secure Server
Certification Authority; cf. Section 5.6.1). However, more prevalent
are the cross-signs of external organizations. First, Verizon started
cross-signing root certificates of WellsFargo since 2013. Specifically
the Baltimore CyberTrust Root cross-signed WellsFargo’sWellsSe-
cure Public Root Certificate Authority and WellsSecure Public Root
Certification Authority 01 G2 in 2013 and 2015, respectively. The
latter was already cross-signed by Verizon Global Root CA in 2013.
All corresponding intermediates were revoked by the CA’s CRL
and Mozilla’s OneCRL in 2017, when the roots were removed from
almost all root stores (after request by WellsFargo [15]), except for
Apple’s store which still includesWellsSecure Public Root Certificate
Authority. Similarly, the Verizon-controlled GTE CyberTrust Global
Root cross-signed Certipost E-Trust Primary Normalized CA provid-
ing this former only byMicrosoft trusted root a broad trust coverage
and creating another cross-sign that survived the acquisition by
Digicert.
Verizon also cross-signed several state-controlled CAs which is
potentially problematic (cf. Section 5.2). In 2010 and 2013, Baltimore
CyberTrust Root cross-signed the Swiss Government root which
increased the formerly limited trust (Apple and Microsoft only).
One of the cross-signs expired in 2014, the other stayed active till
after the Digicert acquisition. In 2013, Belgium Root CA2 replaced
a cross-sign by (non-Digicert) GlobalSign Root from 2007 with a
further Verizon cross-sign by CyberTrust Global Root. This cross-
sign also stayed active after the Digicert acquisition until October
2017 when it was revoked in OneCRL [19]. Verizon also used GTE
CyberTrust Global Root and Baltimore CyberTrust Root to cross-
sign Portugal’s SCEE ECRaizEstado (formerly trusted by Microsoft
only). This time, Digicert actively repeated the latter cross-sign
shortly after obtaining control over the CyberTrust roots. However,
when the cross-sign by GTE CyberTrust Global Root expired in
August 2018, the other cross-signs were revoked due to a series of
misissuances [21]. Overall, several independent CAs thus provided
state-controlled CAs with large trust coverage, larger than provided
by the original root certificates.
Finally, we find only a single cross-sign between Digicert’s very
own roots, i.e.,DigiCert Global Root CA cross-signedDigiCert Trusted
Root G4.
B.6 Entrust: Further Examples
Beyond Entrusts involvement in Digicert cross-signs (cf. Section
B.5.2), Entrust.net Secure Server CA also cross-signed Trustwave’s
Secure Trust CA and the TDC Internet Root of the danish ISP TDC
in 2006.
Furthermore, Entrust Root Certification Authority and Entrust
Root Certification Authority - G2 created the intermediate XS-Cert
Entrust Certification Authority - L1M in 2014. The G2 root revoked
the cross-sign after a month, but replaced it with a new cross-sign.
Also the intermediate XS-Cert Entrust Certification Authority
- L1B was cross-signed by Entrust.net Secure Server Certification
Authority. When the cross-sign expired, the originally issuing En-
trust.net Certification Authority (2048) revoked the original certifi-
cate declaring it superseded.
Moreover, Entrust cross-signed its Entrust.net Secure Server Cer-
tification Authority and Entrust Certification Authority - L1K. These
cross-signs only yield alternative paths.
B.7 Cross-Signing in the Grid PKI
In the grid-PKI, we do not find a real XS-Cert, but an interesting re-
issuance. Originally, ESnet Root CA 1 issued an intermediate named
NERSC Online CA. A month before its expiry, NERSC created a
corresponding root certificate instead of requesting a new interme-
diate. One could argue that ESnet helped NERSC to bootstrap the
trust in its later root.
B.8 Miscellaneous XS-Certs
Finally, we list less prominent cross-signs.
B.8.1 Miscellaneous Internal Root XS-Certs. We find some more
cross-signs of root certificates issued within a CA. Slovenia used
it’s SI-TRUST Root to cross-sign its sigov-ca and sigend-ca. However,
the corresponding root certificates are included only in Microsoft’s
root store.
Several CAs furthermore used an older certificate to sign new
versions: GlobalSign used its older GlobalSign Root CA to cross-sign
the new GlobalSign Root CA - R2 as well as GlobalSign Root CA -
R3. Similarly, Sonera Class2 CA cross-signed TeliaSonera Root CA
v1 and Chunghwa Telecom’s ePKI Root Certification Authority - G2
cross-signed the ePKI Root Certification Authority. Notably ePKI
Root Certification Authority - G2 is itself cross-signed and the root is
only included in recent Microsoft stores whereas the cross-signed
version is widely trusted. Also SECOM’s Security Communication
EV RootCA1 and Security Communication RootCA2 were both cross-
signed by Security Communication RootCA1. Furthermore, Certum
CA cross-signed the newer Certum Trusted Network CA, and the
DST Root CA X3, which also cross-signed the ISRG Roots used
by Let’s Encrypt, cross-signed IdenTrust Commercial Root CA 1.
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Likewise, Taiwan CA cross-signed its TWCA Global Root CA with
the TWCA Root Certification Authority and the Hellenic Academic
and Research Institutions RootCA 2015 got cross-signed by Hellenic
Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2011. Also the Deutsche
Telekom used its established Deutsche Telekom Root CA 2 to cross-
sign the T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 and T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class
3 roots. Finally, the TC TrustCenter Class 2 CA, which only got into
Mozilla and Android root stores for a short time, was cross-signed
by TC TrustCenter Class 2 CA II which reached a better root store
coverage, although the trust does not hold up anymore. The exactly
same applies for TC TrustCenter Class 3 CA and it’s cross-signing
of TC TrustCenter Class 3 CA II.
B.8.2 Miscellaneous Internal Intermediate XS-Certs. Keynectis used
its Certplus (Class 2 Primary CA) to issue the intermediate KEYNEC-
TIS ICS ADVANCED Class 3 CA and cross-signed it with OpenTrust
CA for AATL G1, likewise owned by a Keynectics subsidiary.
Chunghwa Telecom created the intermediate XS-Cert Public
Certification Authority - G2 using its roots ePKI Root Certification
Authority and ePKI Root Certification Authority - G2.
Dhimyotis created the intermediate XS-Certs Certigna Services
CA and Certigna Wild CA which provide trust paths to its Certigna
root as well as the Certigna Root CA which is only in the root stores
of Mozilla and Microsoft yet.
B.8.3 Miscellaneous External Intermediate XS-Certs. Other less
prominent intermediate XS-Certs contain cross-signs issued across
CAs. The Vodafone root issued the Vodafone (Secure Sites) interme-
diate in 2006. GTE CyberTrust Global Root cross-signed this interme-
diate for 2008 to 2015, providing trust paths after the expiry of the
Vodafone root in 2011. Another cross-sign by Baltimore CyberTrust
Root extended this trust to 2017, when it was revoked, or even until
its expiry in December 2019 for clients that miss checking the CRL.
The USERTrust Legacy Secure Server CAwas signed by Entrust.net
Certification Authority (2048) and Entrust.net Secure Server Certifica-
tion Authority in 2009. 14 months before expiry of those intermedi-
ates, AddTrust External CA Root issued a replacement. Similarly, the
AAA Certificate Services was signed by Entrust.net Secure Server Cer-
tification Authority in 2006 and cross-signed by AddTrust External
CA Root in 2008.
When GTE CyberTrust Global Root was owned by Verizon in
2007-09, it issued the intermediates Vodafone (Corporate Domain
2009), Vodafone (Secure Networks), MULTICERT - Entidade de Certi-
ficado 001, MULTICERT-CA 02, LuxTrust root CA, and Munich Re’s
MRG Intermediate CA 01. In 2012 and 2013, it cross-signed these
intermediates with Baltimore CyberTrust Root which offered a va-
lidity up to 2025 instead of only 2018 as the older root. Several of
the intermediates were revoked later on: Both Vodafone certs were
revoked in March 2017. OneCRL only listed the newer cross-signs
as the older certificates were already distrusted by removal of the
Baltimore CyberTrust Root from Mozilla’s root store in 2015. This
was already applied similarly for the Munich Re intermediate XS-
Cert MRG Intermediate CA 01, which was revoked in 2014, when
OneCRL did not exist yet. OneCRL included the recent cross-sign
in October 2016, when the issuer of the older intermediate was
already excluded from Mozilla’s root store. Similarly, the revoca-
tion of MULTICERT - Entidade de Certificado 001 in 2019 and the
revocation of the LuxTrust root CA in 2017 did not affect the older
certificate as it already expired.
In 2015, Entrust issued and cross-signed the intermediate UIS-
IntB using three different CA certificates, each widely trusted.
Finally, we found re-issuances performed by the same CA but
a different CA certificate which thus do not fall in our definition
of cross-signs: In 2016, SHA-1 Federal Root CA G2 reissued the
intermediate CertiPath Bridge CA whose earlier version, issued by
SHA-1 Federal Root CA, expired in 2014, thus not rendering this case
a cross-sign. A similar case holds for SAS Public CA v1 which was
issued by RSA Public Root CA v1 in 2007 and reissued two weeks
after expiration using RSA Security 2048 V3.
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